

concern that it has not entered into force five years after its opening for signature. We therefore stressed our determination to strengthen efforts aimed at promoting its entry into force at the earliest possible date in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

7. After the opening for signature of the CTBT, nuclear explosions were carried out. The countries concerned subsequently declared that they would not conduct further nuclear explosions and indicated their willingness not to delay the entry into force of the Treaty.

8. In the light of the CTBT and bearing in mind its purpose and objectives, we affirm that the conduct of nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion constitutes a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

9. We call upon all States to maintain a moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and underline the importance of signature and ratification of the Treaty.

10. We noted with satisfaction the report of the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to the Conference on progress made by the Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat since November 1996 in fulfillment of the requirement to take all necessary measures to ensure the effective establishment of the future CTBTO.

11. In this connection, we welcomed the momentum which has been developed by the Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat across the Major Programmes of the Commission, as identified by the Executive Secretary in his report. We also welcomed the progress in building the global infrastructure for Treaty verification, including the International Monitoring System, with a view to ensuring that the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty at entry into force. We further welcomed the conclusion of a significant number of related agreements and arrangements with States and with international organizations.

12. Convinced of the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Treaty, welcoming the ratifications of all the States that have done so since the 1999 Conference, and stressing in particular the steps required to achieve its early entry into force, as provided for in article XIV of the Treaty, we:

(a) Call upon all States that have not yet signed the Treaty to sign and ratify it as soon as possible and to refrain from acts which would defeat its object and purpose in the meanwhile;

(b) Call upon all States that have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, to accelerate their ratification processes with a view to early successful conclusion;

(c) Recall the fact that two States out of three whose ratifications are needed for the Treaty's entry into force but which have not yet signed it have expressed their willingness not to delay the entry into force of the Treaty, and call upon them to sign and ratify it as soon as possible;

(d) Note the fact that one State out of three whose ratifications are needed for the Treaty's entry into force but which have not yet signed it has not expressed its intention towards the Treaty, and call upon this State to sign and ratify it as soon as possible so as to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty;

(e) Note the ratification by three nuclear-weapon States and call upon the remaining

two to accelerate their ratification processes with a view to early successful conclusion;

(f) In pursuit of the early entry into force of the Treaty, undertake ourselves to use all avenues open to us in conformity with international law, to encourage further signature and ratification of the Treaty; and urge all States to sustain the momentum generated by this Conference by continuing to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level;

(g) Agree that ratifying States will select one of their number to promote cooperation to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty, through informal consultations with all interested countries; and encourage bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives aimed at promoting further signatures and ratification;

(h) Urge all States to share legal and technical information and advice in order to facilitate the processes of signature, ratification and implementation by the State concerned, and upon their request. We encourage the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to continue supporting actively these efforts consistent with their respective mandates;

(i) Call upon the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to continue its international cooperation activities to promote understanding of the Treaty, including by demonstrating the benefits of the application of verification technologies for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, in order to further encourage signature and ratification of the Treaty;

(j) Reiterate the appeal to all relevant sectors of civil society to raise awareness of and support for the objectives of the Treaty, as well as its early entry into force as provided for in article XIV of the Treaty.

13. We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty's basic obligations and our undertaking to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force.

14. We remain steadfast in our commitment to pursue the efforts to ensure that the Treaty's verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty at entry into force, in accordance with the provisions of article IV of the Treaty. In this context, we will continue to provide the support required to enable the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to complete its tasks in the most efficient and cost-effective way.

15. The Conference addressed the issue of possible future conferences, expressed the determination of its participants to continue working towards entry into force of the Treaty and took note of the provisions contained in paragraph 3 of article XIV of the Treaty.

#### PERSONAL EXPLANATION

**HON. CHARLES A. GONZALEZ**

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, December 19, 2001*

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 483, 484, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498.

Had I been present, I would have voted 483—yes, 484—yes, 485—yes, 486—yes, 487—no, 488—yes, 489—no, 490—yes, 491—yes, 492—yes, 493—yes, 494—yes, 495—yes, 496—yes, 497—yes, 498—yes.

#### CASPIAN PIPELINE OPENS

**HON. JOE BARTON**

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, December 19, 2001*

Mr. BARTON. Mr. Speaker, I commend to my colleagues the following article:

[From the Washington Times, Dec. 3, 2001]

#### CASPIAN PIPELINE OPENS

(By Christopher Pala)

ALMATY, KAZAKHSTAN.—The first pipeline built to bring Kazakhstan's oil to world markets was dedicated in Russia last week, four months late and minus the presidents of the two countries through which it passed.

Speeches delivered near the Russian port of Novorossiisk called the 940-mile steel tube a symbol of international cooperation, and that it is indeed: The Russian Federation and American and Russian oil companies have provided most of the \$2.6 billion cost, and Russia stands to earn \$20 billion over the 40-year life of the pipeline.

But the pipeline is also:

The first step to Kazakhstan's ambitious plan to deliver 3 million barrels a day in 15 years to world markets and become one of the top three oil exporters in the world.

A multibillion-dollar bet by Chevron Corp. in 1993 that is now set to pay off handsomely.

An example of the difficulty of doing business in Russia.

Proof that with perseverance, it can be done.

The pipeline, built by the 11-member Caspian Pipeline Consortium, known as CPC, starts on the desert shores of the northeast Caspian Sea at Tengiz, Kazakhstan, the world's sixth-largest oil field.

The longest 40-inch pipe in the world then curls around the Caspian before striking west across the broad plains north of the Caucasus range and ends at a tanker terminal 10 miles west of Novorossiisk.

When completed, at a final cost of \$4 billion, it will be able to carry up to 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd), more than double its initial capacity.

#### PEAK A DECADE OFF

Output at the Tengiz field, now 270,000 bpd, is not expected to rise to a peak of 700,000 bpd until the end of the decade, said Tom Winterton, head of the Tengizchevroil consortium exploiting the field.

Thus, the pipe has plenty of room for oil from other fields—and there lies one of the major disputes that have delayed the opening.

When Chevron took over Tengiz from its post-Soviet managers, it created one consortium for the oil field and a second one to build a pipeline to the Black Sea.

For the first few years, Tengizchevroil, in which Chevron owns 50 percent, diligently overcame such obstacles as the extreme depth of the reservoir (2½ miles below the surface), its high content of poisonous sulfur dioxide and the high pressure at which the oil was flowing. Production steadily climbed from 25,000 bpd and the jinx that gave Tengiz the longest uncontrolled blowout in Soviet history was overcome.

But in those years, the pipeline consortium got strictly nowhere in its efforts to persuade Russia and its pipeline monopoly Transneft to allow an outlet through Russia to the Black Sea.

It was not until 1996 that two newly created Russian oil giants, Lukoil and Rosneft, bought into the consortium while the Russian government took a 24 percent share. Then things started moving.

Construction took less than three years.